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No Presumptions! Joint Custody in the British Columbia Court of Appeal1 
© 2010 by Susan B. Boyd 
 
Descriptions of Canadian family law trends are disproportionately influenced by developments 
in Ontario, simply because that province produces a large amount of both family law and 
commentary on family law. For example, most Canadian family law books are written by 
Ontario lawyers and law professors, such as Nicholas Bala.2 Much of this work is excellent, and 
it is certainly relied on in other jurisdictions. It can, however, generate a skewed view of 
developments in other provinces. Accordingly, this chapter offers a study of joint custody trends 
in the British Columbia Court of Appeal compared to those in Ontario.  
In 2007, Professor Martha Shaffer published two excellent articles on joint custody.3 Her 
review of Ontario case law focused on contested joint custody after the important 2005 Ontario 
                                                           
1
  This project was funded by the Foundation for Legal Research. Cynthia Poblador, Eiad el 
Fateh and Bree Makohn provided excellent research assistance. Former Justice Donna Martinson 
of the B.C. Supreme Court, recently retired, kindly commented on a draft, as did Vancouver 
family law practitioner John-Paul Boyd. All errors remain my own! 
2
 Citing examples of books alone, one finds Nicholas Bala et al. eds. Canadian Child Welfare 
Law: Children, Families, and the State, Second Edition (Toronto: Thompson, 2004); Berend 
Hovius,  Family Law: Cases, Notes and Materials,  6th student ed. (Scarborough: Thomson 
Carswell, 2005);  Mary Jane Mossman, Families and the Law in Canada: Cases and 
Commentary (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 2004);  Julien Payne and Marilyn 
Payne, Canadian Family Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006). If one were to cite articles, 
Nicholas Bala’s name would, of course, feature prominently. 
3
 Martha Shaffer, “Joint Custody Since Kaplanis and Ladisa – A Review of Recent Ontario Case 
Law” (2007) 26 C.F.L.Q. 315. [“Joint Custody Since Kaplanis”];  Martha Shaffer, “Joint 
Custody, Parental Conflict and Children’s Adjustment to Divorce: What the Social Science 
Literature Does and Does Not Tell Us” (2007) 26 C.F.L.Q. 286. [“Joint Custody, Parental 
Conflict”] 
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Court of Appeal decision in Kaplanis v. Kaplanis,4 which reiterated that court’s cautious 
approach to ordering joint custody in contested cases (taken earlier in Baker v. Baker5 and 
Kruger v. Kruger6). Specifically, it held that joint custody should not be ordered in such cases 
unless there is clear evidence that the parents are able to communicate effectively with one 
another, despite animosity and personal differences. One parent’s opposition to joint custody 
would not, without more, suffice to block such an award.7 However, the message to Ontario 
judges was clear: that joint custody will seldom be in a child’s best interests if the parents are not 
capable of effective communication, as they will not be able to act jointly in their children’s best 
interests. Although Shaffer identified some problems in post-Kaplanis case law, she found that, 
overall, Ontario courts take a cautious approach to joint custody in contested cases and make 
such orders sparingly. 
Shaffer’s article made me wonder to what extent trends were similar in British Columbia 
and whether the cautionary approach in Kaplanis is followed by B.C. judges, especially given 
that anecdotal evidence indicates that joint custody is now the de facto starting point at custody 
hearings. Although a 1994 decision of the B.C. Court of Appeal in Stewart v. Stewart8 adopted a 
very cautious approach to joint custody in the face of communication difficulties, stating that 
such awards should be made rarely and only under circumstances where the parties are totally in 
                                                           
4
 Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, (2005) 10 R.F.L. (6th) 373. A November 2009 review of Ontario Court of 
Appeal cases on joint custody reveals no significant departure from the rulings in Kaplanis and 
its sister case Ladisa v. Ladisa, (2005) 11 R.F.L. (6th)  50. 
5
 Baker v. Baker, (1979) 8 R.F.L. (2d) 236 (Ont. C.A.). 
6
 Kruger v. Kruger, (1979) 11 R.F.L. (2d) 52. (Ont. C.A.). 
7
 Ladisa, supra note 4, released the same day as Kaplanis, made this clear. The Court of Appeal 
upheld a joint custody order despite the mother’s opposition and the fact that high level conflict 
existed between the parents.  Evidence established that the parents could, nevertheless, 
communicate effectively and put the children’s interests ahead of their own. 
8
 Stewart v. Stewart, (1994) 2 R.F.L. (4th) 53 (B.C.C.A.). 
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agreement and for all intents and purposes do not need the assistance of the court, a later decision 
in Robinson v. Filyk9 came out strongly against the use of presumptions in custody decisions, 
negating the force of Stewart. 
In 2008, I undertook a review of judicial decisions dealing with joint custody in the B.C. 
Court of Appeal.10 A search for “joint custody” cases using LexisNexis Quicklaw yielded 99 
cases falling between December 11, 1996, when the B.C. Court of Appeal decided Robinson v. 
Filyk, and spring 2008. Forty-five of these cases dealt with custody as a significant issue on 
appeal, and these cases were studied for the purposes of this chapter.11 Although I will offer 
some figures, this analysis is of course not statistically significant nor does it give an accurate 
picture of all custody cases that go to court; it simply gives a sense of trends within the B.C. 
Court of Appeal over a little more than a decade, based on cases that involved a claim for joint 
custody at some point. My overall conclusion is that the Ontario and British Columbia courts 
may not depart radically from one another, but the jurisprudence of B.C.’s appellate court reveals 
some significant differences in emphasis that may be of concern. 
 
No Presumptions: Robinson v. Filyk (1996)  
                                                           
9
 Robinson v. Filyk, (1996) 84 B.C.A.C. 290, [1996] B.C.J. No. 2519. 
10
 This study differs from Shaffer’s “Joint Custody Since Kaplanis”, supra note 3, because it is 
both broader (hers focused on Kaplanis and on joint custody in close proximity to 
communication, co-operation or conflict) and narrower (because it focuses only on appellate 
level decisions). I have also conducted a review of B.C. trial decisions on joint custody for the 
years 2000 and 2007, in an effort to gauge any shift in approach over time. The results of that 
review will be published separately. 
11
 A further 54 BCCA cases turned up based on a search for “joint custody” in BCCA cases 
falling between December 11, 1996 and spring 2008. The vast majority involved a joint custody 
award that was not questioned on appeal; instead the issue on appeal was child or spousal 
support or matrimonial property, a jurisdictional issue, contempt of court, child protection or 
criminal law. 
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In December 1996, the B.C. Court of Appeal rendered an important judgement in Robinson v. 
Filyk.12 On appeal, a non-custodial mother sought an order of joint guardianship or joint custody, 
having been denied sole custody at trial. The trial judge had found little to choose between the 
parents, who had made consensual shared parenting arrangements until each moved away from 
B.C., the father to London, Ontario, and the mother to Calgary, Alberta. The father was a 
university professor who had re-married. The mother was a medical student in Calgary, who was 
living with her mother in the maternal family home. Each parent originally sought joint or sole 
custody and primary residence. The trial judge found it inappropriate to grant joint physical 
custody, because that was the point on which the parents had been unable to agree. He went on to 
conclude, reluctantly, that, given the geographical separation, a joint order of custody and 
guardianship was unworkable, citing the cautious approach of the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Baker v. Baker,13 suggesting that joint custody is an exceptional disposition appropriate only 
where two parties will be able to co-operate. He awarded the mother only reasonable and 
generous access, but expressed the “hope and expectation” that Mr. Robinson will consult with 
Ms. Filyk on all major decisions concerning the development of Pascale”.14 When the father 
moved to Norway, the mother appealed, asking for joint guardianship and joint custody. The 
father did not disagree that joint guardianship would be in the daughter’s best interests. 
The Court of Appeal followed the Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Young v. 
Young15 and Gordon v. Goertz16 in making a strong statement that the only consideration in 
custody cases is the best interests of the child and that there is no legal presumption in favour of 
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 Robinson, supra note 9 at para. 8. 
13
 Baker, supra note 5. 
14
 Robinson, supra note 9 at para. 8. 
15
 Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3. 
16
 Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27. 
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either sole or joint custody. Importantly, Huddart J.A. distanced herself from her earlier opinion 
(when a County Court judge) in Anson v. Anson that a joint custody and joint guardianship order 
would be appropriate “where both parents are excellent parents, there is a history of cooperation 
with respect to parenting of the child and there is no valid reason to exclude a parent from having 
significant input into the raising of the child”.17 She now saw such an opinion as being as much 
of a legal or factual presumption as had been seen in the early Ontario Court of Appeal decisions 
in Baker and Kruger.18 Huddart J.A. also stated that the “essence of [the mother’s] argument is 
that the trial judge in effect applied a presumption in favour of sole custody…when he adopted 
the cautious approach to joint custody taken …by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Baker v. Baker 
… and Kruger v. Kruger …, approved by this court in Stewart v. Stewart …, rather than making 
the enquiry into Pascale’s particular circumstances…”.19 She then made a key statement: 
It is now clear that legal and factual presumptions have no place in an enquiry into the 
best interests of a child, however much predictive value they may have. The Supreme 
Court of Canada has stated absolutely clearly that such presumptions detract from the 
individual justice to which every child is entitled.20 
 
In other words, any indication in a judgement of a presumption in favour of (or against) either 
joint or sole custody is inappropriate. Instead, the only issue is a child’s best interests, to be 
“found within the practical context of the reality of the parents’ lives and circumstances”.21  
Although Huddart J.A. affirmed the principle that appellate courts should interfere with 
trial decisions only rarely,22 she added: 
                                                           
17
 Anson v. Anson, (1987) 10 B.C.L.R. (2d) 357 (B.C. County Court) at 370.  
18
 Baker; Kruger, supra note 5 and 6. 
19
 Robinson, supra note 9 at para. 20. 
20
 Ibid. at para. 22. 
21
 Ibid. at para. 29, quoting from Gordon, supra note 16 at para. 59. 
22
 Ibid. at para. 16. 
  6 
 
If the reasons [of a trial judge] reveal a mindset with a pre-ordained default position, then 
the decision must be reviewed as if that mindset were not there. The trial judge who 
brings presumptions to the enquiry is not considering the best interests of the particular 
child in the particular circumstances and will have erred.23 
 
In the case at hand, Huddart J.A. did not interfere with the award of sole custody to the father, 
even though she said that the trial judge could be read as having endorsed the cautious approach 
of Ontario courts, which suggests a threshold test before joint custody would be ordered.24 The 
reason for her deference to the trial decision was that joint decision-making would not be 
workable because the geographic separation would continue to exacerbate the communication 
difficulties that had emerged after the parents’ respective relocations.  
Somewhat contradictorily, however, Huddart J.A. did vary the order to provide for joint 
guardianship, in order to ensure that (a) the mother would have decision-making authority when 
the child was with her and (b) should the father die, guardianship would pass directly to the 
mother without a court order being necessary.25  In addition, she noted that the Family Relations 
Act contains a provision permitting a joint guardian to ask for directions on various issues rather 
than applying for a change of custody,26 and that this enquiry “would remove some of the threat 
implicit in the more adversarial application for a change of custody”.27 She added that:  
Geographical separation may make a joint custody order unworkable, but it makes a joint 
guardianship order desirable when a child spends considerable periods of time with the 
non-custodial parent and that parent is the obvious person to assume the care-giving of 
the child upon the death or incapacity of the custodial parent.28  
 
                                                           
23
 Ibid. at para. 30. 
24
 Ibid. at para. 32. 
25
 Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128, s. 29. 
26
 Ibid., s. 32. 
27
 Robinson, supra note 9 at para. 14. 
28
 Ibid. at para. 16. 
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This award raises the thorny question somewhat peculiar to B.C. as to what the difference is 
between joint custody, which Huddart J.A. refused to order, and joint guardianship, which she 
did order.  
 
Terminology: The B.C. Difference 
Terminology is generally a problem in the custody field, as Shaffer notes: some courts use the 
term “joint custody” to connote arrangements giving both parents shared decision-making 
authority over significant child-rearing issues, and others use it to mean shared physical care.29 
When “shared parenting” is used by the B.C. Court of Appeal, it is usually in relation to physical 
care of the child or to describe access arrangements, e.g. where the child lives with each parent 
alternately.30 “Shared custody” is used occasionally, generally to connote roughly equal shared 
time with a child and sometimes where joint custody is already in place, implying that the terms 
may mean something different.31  
Terminology is further complicated in British Columbia, in a way that it is not in Ontario, 
by the concept of “guardianship”, which co-exists, not always peacefully, with the concept of 
custody. Under section 27 of the Family Relations Act, married parents and parents who cohabit 
are joint guardians of the child. If they separate, they remain joint guardians of the child’s estate 
but the parent who has the usual care and control of the child is the sole guardian of the child, 
unless otherwise agreed or ordered.32 Section 34 then outlines who may exercise custody over a 
                                                           
29
 Shaffer, “Joint Custody Since Kaplanis”, supra note 3 at page 321. 
30
 E.g. Nunweiler v. Nunweiler, 2000 BCCA 300, [2000] B.C.J. No. 935. 
31
 E.g. Parker v. Parker, 2002 BCCA 299. The father wanted one week on, one week off, but the 
court found insufficient evidence to warrant increased contact. The parents already had joint 
custody and guardianship.  
32
 Family Relations Act, supra note 25, ss. 27- 28. [my emphasis]. 
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child in terms that are generally parallel to those in section 27. These sections do not assist very 
much in defining the ambit of guardianship and custody or the relationship between them. 
Indeed, in 1990 the Court of Appeal stated in Lennox v. Frender that the terms “guardianship”, 
“custody” and “care and control” are “often used without precision” but “may, in some 
circumstances, have different meanings from each other.”33 The Court added that these terms 
may have different meanings for the purposes of the Divorce Act than for the Family Relations 
Act, and suggested that it would be better if parties and/or courts spelled out what is intended, for 
instance, in minutes of settlement, rather than relying on legal jargon. It reviewed earlier B.C. 
Supreme Court cases34 indicating that joint guardianship normally meant that each parent would 
have a full and active role in providing a sound moral, social, economic and educational 
environment for the children, and that they should consult with one another in planning the 
religious upbringing, educational programs, athletic and recreational activities, health care 
(excluding emergency), and significant changes in the social environment. Neither party should 
exercise this power and authority to frustrate or unduly affect the life of the other, and each 
should exert best efforts to co-operate in future plans consistent with the children’s best interests. 
The Court of Appeal went on in Lennox to review definitions of joint custody in the 
Ontario cases Baker and Kruger, indicating that joint custody gave equal parental control over, 
and equal ultimate parental responsibility for, the care, upbringing and education of the child, but 
that the child might nevertheless be ordered to reside with one parent who had immediate 
direction and guidance, while the other parent enjoyed access. The Court “accept[ed] these 
descriptions of joint custody when it is not distinguished from guardianship” as saying 
                                                           
33
 Lennox v. Frender, (1990) 27 R.F.L. (3d) 181. (B.C.C.A.). 
34
 Quoting especially from Gansner, L.J.S.C. in Charlton v. Charlton, (1980), 19 B.C.L.R. 42 
(B.C.S.C.) at 45. 
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essentially the same thing: “That is, that parents with joint custody continue to act as parents and 
continue to have the right to share in the making of important decisions respecting the child.” For 
instance, in Lennox the mother, who had care and control of the child, but shared joint custody 
with the father, did not have the authority to decide unilaterally to send the child to private 
school.35 
Anson v. Anson, an oft-cited 1987 decision by Judge Huddart when she sat on the B.C. 
County Court, defined the “ancient” concept of “guardianship” as the full bundle of rights and 
duties assumed by an adult in respect of a child and stated that under both federal and B.C. 
legislation, “custody” has come to hold a similar wide meaning, going beyond a narrower 
conception of physical care and control.36 As a result, an award of custody would give a full 
bundle of rights and responsibilities to the custodial parent, apart from those reserved to a 
guardian. Anson v. Anson also stated that a joint custody order should not be viewed as a finite 
disposition, but a broad range of post-separation custodial arrangements, the details of which are 
to be worked out. The key is where the residual authority lies. In Anson, Huddart Co. Ct. J. stated 
that “[j]oint guardianship and joint custody orders grant both divorced or separated parents an 
equal voice in the upbringing of their children.”  Neither is given final decision-making authority 
and normally, the parties must consult with each other and decide what is best for the child. If 
                                                           
35
 See the later case J.B.R. v. A.M.R., 2003 BCCA 135, where the BCCA remanded a case back 
to the BCSC.  The trial court had awarded joint custody and joint guardianship with primary 
residence to the father, but also allowed the father to determine the children’s schooling and 
terms of the mother’s access. The question was whether these terms were consistent with a joint 
custody and joint guardianship award. 
36
 Anson, supra note 17. 
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they cannot agree, either guardian can consult a professional third party or seek directions from 
the Court under the Family Relations Act.37 
As it was discussed in Lennox and Anson, joint guardianship seems strikingly similar to 
what scholars would typically call “joint legal custody” and what many courts refer to as simply 
“joint custody”. Shaffer similarly uses “joint custody” to refer to “arrangements in which parents 
share the authority to make significant decisions over their children’s lives – that is, on matters 
relating to their children’s education, health care and religious upbringing.”38  Yet Robinson v. 
Filyk indicates that a joint guardianship order might be made in circumstances where joint 
decision-making is not workable, for reasons to do with the passing of guardianship after death 
of the custodial parent and exercise of authority while the child is with the non-custodial parent. 
It appears that pragmatic reasons led Huddart J.A. to distinguish between joint custody and joint 
guardianship in Robinson v. Filyk. She also signalled that an award of joint guardianship might 
avert adversarial proceedings in the future. As the B.C. Court of Appeal indicates in Falvai v. 
Falvai, an award of joint guardianship can ameliorate the broad concept of custody, which 
normally entails the full bundle of rights relating to both physical care and control and decision-
making authority.39 It is possible that joint guardianship may be ordered in some cases, or 
                                                           
37
 In the Anson case, the parents often disagreed on questions of the health care and education of 
their son, but Huddart Co. Ct. J. nevertheless overturned the Provincial Court decision, which 
had awarded sole custody to the mother with joint guardianship, but not joint custody. I wonder 
whether the Provincial Court Judge had resisted joint custody precisely because of the history of 
disagreement on health care and education. Huddart Co. Ct. J. instead emphasized the history of 
cooperation with regard to parenting. Recall that this decision is one that Huddart J.A. distanced 
herself in Robinson v. Filyk, supra note 9. 
38
 Shaffer, “Joint Custody Since Kaplanis”, supra note 3 at page 322. 
39
  Falvai v. Falvai, 2008 BCCA 503, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2365. 
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suggested in settlement conferences,40 in order to encourage parents to stop contesting custody 
and get on with post-separation parenting. Interestingly, joint guardianship is awarded not only 
in non-divorce scenarios in which the provincial Family Relations Act would be the governing 
statute, but also in claims for custody in divorce scenarios. 
As we have seen, joint guardianship and joint custody are not always awarded together. 
In fact, B.C. decisions generally indicate an “unbundling”41 of the rights and responsibilities 
associated with custody, with a perhaps surprising variety of orders. Joint guardianship 
sometimes is ordered in tandem with a sole custody award and sometimes with a joint custody 
award.  A “Master Joyce Model” of joint guardianship is sometimes used to clarify what is 
meant.42  Under this model, which is premised on one parent having primary care, each parent 
has the obligation to discuss with each other matters and decisions of a significant nature 
                                                           
40
 Justice Donna Martinson suggested in 2007 that there is a growing trend among judges in 
family law cases, particularly in the context of pre-trial settlement conferences, to emphasize the 
importance of shared parenting so that children have the benefit of contact with both parents: 
Donna Martinson, “Post-Separation Parenting – Submerged Gender Issues”, Paper for the 
National Judicial Institute Conference on Emerging Gender Issues – Why Gender Equality Still 
Matters, Toronto, November 28-30, 2007 (Toronto: Canada). Full evidence about issues such as 
conflict or abuse is not typically available at pre-trial settlement conferences, which raises 
concerns about any trend towards emphasizing shared arrangements. 
41
 The term “unbundling” is more commonly used in relation to legal services, offering parties 
who cannot afford full legal representation the option to choose legal services à la carte rather 
than having to opt between full and no legal services: Franklin R. Garfield, “Unbundling legal 
services in mediation: reflections of a family lawyer” (2002) 40(1) Family Court Review 76-86. 
A special issue of the Family Court Review covering issues of unbundled law was published in 
January 2002 
42
 http://www.familylaw.lss.bc.ca/resources/fact_sheets/guardianship.asp . Other models include 
the Charlton Model, which emphasizes the importance of cooperation and the Master Horne 
Model, which is similar to the Joyce Model but has no clause giving one parent final decision-
making authority; guardianship is described primarily in terms of a parent's right to get 
information about the child and participate in decision-making. The Joyce Model is used more 
often in orders and agreements, according to J.P. Boyd 
(http://www.bcfamilylawresource.com/03/0302body.htm ) but my study does not indicate it is 
used in a majority of joint guardianship awards. 
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concerning the child, including those concerning health (except emergency decisions), education, 
religious instruction, and general welfare. In the event the parents cannot reach agreement 
despite best efforts, the primary care parent has the right to make such decision. The other parent 
may seek a review under the afore-mentioned section 32. Each parent has the right to obtain 
information about the child from third parties. 
Having identified the terminological minefield in British Columbia (which may or may 
not be resolved when the Family Relations Act is revised), I turn now to examine the trends in 
the B.C. Court of Appeal cases relating to joint custody.  
 
Appellate Trends in B.C. 1996-2008 
The Court of Appeal made some strong statements in Robinson v. Filyk, and a key question is 
whether the Court has followed its directives in favour of deference to trial judgements and 
against the use of presumptions of any sort. Another question is how the Court deals with 
difficulties with communication and cooperation, given its distancing from the approach of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal and from the use of any presumptions. Prior to addressing these 
questions, an overview of the decisions will reveal the “unbundling” of the rights and 
responsibilities associated with custody that characterizes the B.C. decisions, as well as the 
gender dynamics.  
 
Unbundling of Custody  
Perhaps the most interesting finding in this study is the need to carefully examine the actual 
orders under the labels “sole custody” or “joint custody” and the “unbundling” of custody that is 
revealed. Orders that appeared on their face to be for sole custody might actually involve aspects 
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commonly associated with joint custody, such as joint decision-making (often via a joint 
guardianship order). By the same token, orders for joint custody might relegate physical custody 
and/or decision-making authority primarily to one parent. This unbundling of custody relates to a 
trend that I have previously referred to as the enlargement of access and a diminishing of the 
authority associated with custody.43 As Justice D.M. Smith has said, this narrower concept of 
custody has become increasingly prevalent.44 The trend to “unbundle” custody may lend support 
to those who would argue that the language of “custody” and “access” is outmoded and should 
be removed in law reform processes. On the other hand, the fact that so many joint custody 
awards preserve primary residence or decision-making to one parent speaks to some degree of 
caution that B.C. courts signal about awarding “equal” rights to parents. Moreover, in a not 
insignificant number of cases, courts still decide that sole custody orders are warranted. 
 
1. Sole Custody 
About 58% of the cases reviewed involved orders for sole custody that were usually appealed by 
a parent who argued for sole or joint custody, or often, one of those in the alternative. In some 
cases, joint custody was barely discussed by the Court, the implication being that it was 
inappropriate. These decisions were made on the basis of the best interests of the child and/or a 
finding that the parents could not communicate or were not cooperative.45 There was little 
evidence in these decisions of any presumption against joint custody when there is an inability to 
                                                           
43
 Susan B. Boyd, Child Custody, Law, and Women’s Work (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 
2003) at 130. 
44
 Falvai, supra note 39 at para. 37. 
45
 E.g. Pratap v. Pratap,  2005 BCCA 71, where the trial judge found that it would not be in the 
best interests of the children to disrupt their lives by removing them from the situation (sole 
custody with the mother; generous access with the father) in which they had been comfortably 
settled for 2.5 years. The father’s “controlling personality” was also a factor, but only one factor.  
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communicate; rather, evidence of inability to communicate was usually assessed and taken into 
account, albeit sometimes briefly.  
Sole custody awards were not always traditional in form, although the majority were. A 
few cases awarded sole custody to one parent (more often, but not always, the mother) but then 
varied the exclusivity of sole custody by awarding an aspect of custody such as joint 
guardianship, or even primary care to another party. Ness v. Ness, for instance, awarded the 
mother sole custody, but granted joint guardianship to the father.46 Joint custody was viewed as 
inappropriate because the parents lacked the proper degree of mutual deference and respect to 
create a harmonious environment for the children.  A very unusual award was affirmed in 
Metzner, with sole custody to the father but primary care to the mother. Joint custody, on the 
other hand, was viewed as inappropriate because “the parties could not agree on anything.”47   In 
two cases involving aboriginal children, sole custody was granted to one parent, with joint 
guardianship to the other parent.48 This unbundling of the rights and responsibilities associated 
with traditional awards of sole custody dilutes the exclusive and primary control that sole 
custody connotes, often making the award more palatable to the other parent.49 
 
2. Joint Custody 
                                                           
46
 Ness v. Ness, 1999 BCCA 51, [1999] B.C.J. No. 262, per Lambert J.A. 
47Metzner v. Metzner, [1997] 91 B.C.A.C. 241, [1997] B.C.J. No. 904, at para. 58. 
48L(A). v. K. (D.), 2000 BCCA 455, additional reasons in L.(A.) v. K.(D.) 2000 BCCA 633; 
M.(B.L.) v. M. (G.T.), 2003 BCCA 381. 
49
 This was clearly not the case in the unusual Metzner decision, given that the mother appealed 
on the grounds that the award of sole custody to the father was not workable and went against the 
children’s best interests. This award also generated various questions with regard to child 
support, since the payor parent was also the custodial parent. Metzner, supra note 47. 
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Joint custody awards were made at trial in about 42% of the cases we reviewed, usually 
combined with joint guardianship. Only two of these cases were successfully appealed, and not 
on the joint custody award itself. Problems of communication rarely seemed to be the key issue 
in these appeals, which is not to say that problems of communication or about access never 
existed.50 In one case, evidence of ability to communicate under a joint guardianship model 
worked against a mother’s appeal against a joint custody award. A “Master Joyce” model of 
guardianship was involved under which the mother, who held the responsibilities of primary 
parent, had to consult with the father about significant decisions concerning the children.51 The 
mother’s argument that the joint custody award should be overturned in favour of sole custody to 
her (to reflect the respective roles she and the father now played in the children’s lives) failed 
because she was agreeable to extensive parental consultation (joint guardianship), plus her 
children were of an age (nine to eighteen) where, the Court of Appeal said, custody has little 
significance.52A few appeals reflected a challenge by a parent who sought sole custody on the 
basis that the joint custody scheme was not workable,53 or that the trial court did not give weight 
to the status quo.54 In one case, the parents had joint custody of two elder children but sole 
custody of a younger child was awarded to the father; the mother applied unsuccessfully for an 
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 E.g. McLean v. Russell, (1999) 126 B.C.A.C. 203, (communication problems); Ebrahim v. 
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54A.(M.F.) v. A.(R.D.), 2002 BCCA 210, additional reasons at A.(M.F.) v. A.(R.D.), 2002 BCCA 
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extension of time to adduce fresh evidence about how joint custody had (or had not) worked 
out.55  
The vast majority of joint custody awards were modified by an award of primary 
residence or primary care to one parent and, notably, more appeals arose on these details rather 
than on joint custody itself. In one case, the mother appealed, unsuccessfully, a variation order 
specifying that each parent had primary residence for one child.56 Sometimes the parents had 
initially agreed on the terms in a separation agreement, but often they were judicially imposed at 
some stage. Most of these “detail” appeals related to a relocation. For instance, one parent might 
want to overturn a primary residence order to the other parent to prevent that parent from moving 
with the child. Or, one parent might seek a primary residence order in his or her favour in order 
that s/he be able to move with the child.  
The preponderance of appeals on collateral issues such as primary care rather than joint 
custody itself, even if problems related to communication or access existed or if relations seemed 
acrimonious,57 indicates a certain acceptance of the normativity of joint custody – which 
sometimes had been agreed to by the parents themselves rather than judicially imposed. It also 
illustrates that awarding joint custody in an effort to diffuse adversarial stances between parents 
may not always succeed; the disputes simply shift to the details such as primary residence and 
relocation.58  
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Gender and Appeals 
All of the cases reviewed involved opposite sex parents, which is not surprising given how few 
custody disputes between same sex parents have, as yet, reached the courts. In a majority of 
cases (about 71%), the father was the appellant and, as we will see below, most appeals failed. 
His appeal often reflected his wish to alter an award of sole custody to the mother (mothers 
received the vast majority of sole custody awards) in favour of either sole custody to him or joint 
custody. Fathers also appealed orders of primary care or residence to mothers, who received a 
majority of such awards. Sometimes they challenged relocations by mothers or wanted to alter a 
joint custody award to a sole custody award in his favour.59 Fathers successfully appealed three 
cases.  Two fathers succeeded in having the trial judgement of sole custody to the mother 
overturned and in gaining custody.60 The third father succeeded in having the case remanded to 
trial to determine whether sole custody to the mother was warranted or whether the separation 
agreement providing for joint custody, with primary residence to the father, should have been 
reflected in the order.61  
Mothers generally appealed orders for sole custody to the father (sometimes related to 
relocation); awards of primary residence to the father or a refusal of relocation; or a Hague 
Convention return of a child to another jurisdiction. In one case, a mother succeeded in having an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Family Law Reform Act” (2000) 14(2) Australian J. of Family Law 142;  John Dewar and 
Stephen Parker,” The Impact of the New Part VII Family Law Act 1975” (1999) 13 Australian J. 
of Family L. 96. 
59
 Carr, supra note 53, involved the latter scenario. 
60
 Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2000 BCCA 167, [2000] B.C.J. No. 491; Struck v. Struck, 2003 
BCCA 623. The decision in Van de Perre was overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada:  Van 
de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60.  
61
 M.L.H. v. T.R.H., [2006] B.C.J. No. 521. Separation agreements were by no means always 
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interim award of sole custody to the father overturned in favour of interim joint custody.62 In 
another she was able to obtain sole custody on appeal.63 
Although the gendered dynamics in these appeal cases might be seen as feeding the fire 
of the fathers’ rights movement,64 awards of sole custody and primary care to mothers must be 
seen against the backdrop of evidence that in most opposite sex parenting scenarios, parenting 
remains gendered. Mothers still assume more primary responsibility for children and most of the 
responsibility dimension that involves the planning, scheduling, orchestrating and coordination 
of family activities. The time that mothers devote to child care actually increased between 1986 
and 2005, even as fathers become more involved in child care. Women also account for 89% of 
stay-at-home parents.65 It should be no surprise that these patterns would often continue after 
separation or divorce. Nevertheless, fathers did receive several awards of primary residence or 
care, in addition to the numerous joint custody awards.  
It must also be noted that in some cases, a father’s behaviour (e.g. substance abuse, 
assaults) accounted for judicial resistance to awarding him joint (or sole) custody rather than any 
predetermined bias against paternal custody. For example, in three cases, (self-represented) 
fathers had actually refused to exercise access with their children because they had not been 
awarded custody.  In Dhaliwal v. Beloud, joint custody had been ruled out by the trial judge due 
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to the inability of the parents to communicate. Although the mother had shown a more amenable 
and flexible attitude in the latter stages of proceedings, the parties continued to have a “high 
degree of antipathy” at appeal.66 The father was also found to have terminated his access with his 
son in an attempt to gain custody. The father had been self-represented, which had clearly 
presented the Court with difficulties, but he could well afford counsel and the Court advised that 
he consider retaining a lawyer to assist with negotiations.67 Somewhat similarly, in E.J.P. v. 
E.A.K., the father had refused to exercise his supervised access. One of the orders he sought was: 
“For the judge to be held responsible for his actions in forcefully removing a loving father from 
the son's life, slandering the father in the son's eyes, and having this published on the internet, 
and violating the state's obligation to help parents protect their children.” Southin J.A. called him 
on his strategy: “… you told us this morning that you do not propose to attempt to implement the 
order because your position is that either there should be joint custody or you do not want this 
access.”68 Given that he agreed, the Court decided that his mission was to retry the question of 
the sole custody award to the mother, and dismissed the appeal. In Green v. Millar, a father who 
challenged the constitutionality of the statutory provisions concerning custody and access in 
addition to wanting to set aside the order of sole custody and guardianship to the mother, refused 
to exercise access because it was supervised (due to the fact that the father imposed conflict on 
the child during access visits). He asked that "the parties be recognized in full equality at law as 
the parents" of their child, which the Court took to mean joint guardianship and joint custody.69 
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He had left the mother after he kicked down a bedroom door (she had locked herself in with the 
child), after which a restraining order was made and then varied to permit him supervised access. 
In the last two cases at least, the discourse of the father appellants resembled that used in the 
fathers’ rights movement, which often takes a stance quite antagonistic to mothers.70 
 
Deference to Trial Judges: Only Occasional Reversals 
The B.C. Court of Appeal generally appears to apply the principle of deference to trial judges: in 
only about 15% (7) of the 45 cases did the Court of Appeal reverse the trial decision or remand 
the case back for further hearing. As C.M. Huddart J.A. put it in Bain v. Bain, “this Court rarely 
interferes with a child care regime put in place by a trial judge. It may do so only when there is a 
material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence or an error in law.”71 The scope of 
appellate review regarding interim orders is even narrower,72 and the court should maintain the 
status quo in the absence of reasons to the contrary.73 Moreover, since appeals will be generally 
unsuccessful because of the narrow scope of appellate review, the Court has said that, provided 
parents have a long history of cooperating, it is usually in the best interest of the child that their 
disagreements be dealt with through an application for variation before the trial court.74 
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Given its strong statement against presumptions, one might have expected that the Court 
of Appeal would be inclined to overturn trial decisions that ventured too close to a legal or 
factual presumption. But rarely did it do so, reflecting the dominance of the principle of 
deference to the orders of trial judges. The reasons for overturning mostly related to a lack of 
sufficient evidence to ground the order, or to improper weight given by trial judges to material 
evidence. An example of the latter was the well known decision overturning a sole custody 
award to the (single) biological mother Kimberley Van de Perre, with joint guardianship to the 
biological father Theodore (Blue) Edwards, who was married to a third party. In a controversial 
decision subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada,75 the BC Court of Appeal 
overturned the trial judge because it found that the judge had relied excessively on negative 
factors related to the father. The appellate court not only added Edwards’ wife as a party but 
granted joint custody to her and to Edwards, with joint guardianship and access to the mother. 
The Court also laid some emphasis on the fact that the child was mixed race and might benefit 
from living with the father, who was African American.  
In one case, Nunweiler v. Nunweiler, involving a mother’s relocation, the Court of 
Appeal did address problematic presumptions in its finding of reversible error in the trial judge’s 
(mis)apprehension of the facts and evidence. Madam Justice Saunders noted that an approach 
that considers the status quo to be the preferred position should a convincing case for a move not 
be made re-inserts a presumption (in favour of the status quo) into custody discussions. The 
Court also found this approach to be contrary to the instruction in Gordon v. Goertz to respect 
the view of the parent wishing to relocate, barring an improper motive.76  The trial judge had 
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attempted to determine the mother’s residence by awarding her joint custody and primary 
residence only if she were to move back to the town where the father lived. Otherwise the father 
would be awarded sole custody. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had not fully 
considered the child’s best interests and took the rare step of substituting an order rather than 
ordering a new hearing. Taking into account that the trial judge had recognized the 
appropriateness of the child residing primarily with her mother, the Court substituted an order of 
sole custody with the mother, without geographic restriction, combined with generous access to 
the father and joint guardianship to confirm his legal responsibility.77 
 
No Presumptions 
The strong statement by the B.C. Court of Appeal in Robinson v. Filyk against presumptions 
either in favour or against sole or joint custody has not been challenged at the appellate level. 
Indeed the Court of Appeal applauded a trial judge for not relying “upon any presumption in 
favour of the mother as a primary caregiver”.78 In a dissent in Rail v. Rail, however, Prowse J.A. 
indicated some push-back on Huddart J.A.’s reiteration for the majority that “[o]ne cannot begin 
with presumptions with articulated premises.”79 The issue in this case was not joint custody per 
se, but rather whether the son should have his primary residence with the father instead of the 
mother. (Permanent residence with the mother had been agreed under a joint custody and 
guardianship arrangement for the two children). Prowse J.A. found two errors made by the 
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chambers judge and would have retained the status quo. While she stated clearly that it could not 
be disputed “that the court must not commence a best interests analysis with presumptions in 
favour of the status quo or of the primary parent, that is not to say that those factors are not 
entitled to significant weight in determining where the best interests of the child lie.”80 She 
emphasized that the seven year old son had lived primarily with his mother and his sister since 
he was 10 months old and that, although the relationship with his father was a good one, it had 
not been put to the test on a day-to-day basis.81 In a prefiguring of the Supreme Court of Canada 
warning in Van de Perre v. Edwards, Prowse J.A. also stated that she could not see how the fact 
that the father could offer a two-parent home, while the mother could not, could tilt the balance 
in favour of moving the son out of his mother’s home, given the strong support network the 
mother had in place involving grandparents and other competent caregivers.82 The majority 
decision by Huddart J.A. acknowledged that factors such as maintenance of the status quo, the 
tender years doctrine and the premise that courts should avoid splitting siblings were not rules of 
law, but were considerations to be taken into account in the context of all the factors that must be 
considered when determining best interests of a child whose parents cannot agree.83 
Some appellate cases implicitly referenced the dangers of presumptions, but rarely were 
they explicitly addressed. In M.J.D. v. J.P.D. the Court emphasized a trial judge statement that a 
lack of co-operation does not always lead to a refusal of an order of joint custody, but affirmed 
the trial holding that where co-operation on any controversial matter appears unlikely, joint 
                                                           
80
 Ibid. at para. 34, per Prowse J.A. in dissent. 
81
 Ibid. at para. 38, 39. 
82
 Ibid. at para. 49.  See also Van de Perre, supra note 60. 
83
 Ibid. at para. 18, per Huddart J.A. 
  24 
 
custody might be unwise.84 In Cross v. Cross, Hall J.A. affirmed a variation of a joint custody 
award with alternating blocks of time with each parent, in favour of sole custody to a mother, 
citing “an unfortunate history of controversy over the care and custody of their child”.85 
Although he had found that both husband and wife were loving and worthy parents, he noted that 
it “has been observed in other cases that joint custody is usually only feasible where there is a 
fairly highly level of agreement between the parents” and in this case it had been demonstrated 
that there was “a quite low level of agreement.”86 Some might see a hint of a presumption in this 
language. 
 
Communication and Co-operation 
The Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Kaplanis has not yet been cited by the B.C. Court of 
Appeal, as of November 2009, which may not be surprising given that, as we saw above, the 
B.C. Court earlier distanced itself in Robinson v. Filyk from the cautious approach to joint 
custody endorsed by the Ontario Court when there is evidence of inability to communicate. In 
one case in our study, Carr v. Carr, the appellant father challenged an award of joint custody, 
with children living with each parent during alternate weeks. He invoked the 1994 B.C. Court of 
Appeal decision in Stewart v. Stewart, standing for a cautious approach to joint custody.87 The 
Court did not state that Stewart had been altered by Robinson v. Filyk, but dismissed the appeal 
because a new custody and access report reported only relatively minor difficulties in 
communication, whereas the children had adjusted well to the routine and appeared to be 
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benefiting from the schedule.88 Arguably this approach reflected the spirit of Robinson, which 
directs that the evidence must be looked at carefully, rather than making assumptions based on 
the quality of communication. 
Despite its strong position against presumptions, the B.C. Court has paid attention to the 
ability or inability of parents to communicate or cooperate. Sometimes a determination of 
inability to communicate was based on evidence that one parent has an anger management 
problem or has assaulted the other. For instance, in Javid v. Kurytnik, the trial judge found that 
an order for joint custody would not be in the children’s best interests. The father had organized 
his time in order to be able to be with the children as much as possible, but had not dealt with his 
anger management problems and he attributed all problems to the mother or others, rather than 
himself. The Court of Appeal found that “the evidence is overwhelming that these two parents 
could not communicate sufficiently to permit them to co-parent two young girls.”89 It also stated 
that: “Whatever reasons underlie their parents’ inability to communicate sensibly and to co-
operate in caring for Emma and Maxwell, the parents’ conflict is real and continuing”.90 In Bain 
v. Bain, the Court stated that the evidence was overwhelming that the parents could not 
communicate sufficiently to permit them to co-parent the two young daughters.91 The Court did 
not state specifically why, but a restraining order prohibiting the father from having contact with 
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the mother and entry on the property where she was residing was kept in place. The mother was 
not concerned that the father would be physically violent with the children, but there were 
references to the volatility of his behaviour and “the nasty difficulties during some access visit 
exchanges.”92 The trial judge had found that the father had threatened and intimidated the 
mother. In Ness v. Ness, the trial judge had found that the mother expressed a continued fear 
about Mr. Ness and referred to an earlier restraining order, although the Court of Appeal simply 
referred to a lack of the requisite degree of mutual deference and respect to warrant joint 
custody.93  
In her Ontario study, Shaffer found that in their focus on communication and 
cooperation, some post-Kaplanis decisions tend to lose sight of the point that joint custody 
should only be considered where both parents have a strong claim to custody based on the 
relevant statutory factors speaking to children’s best interests, and should not be ordered if it is 
clearly in the children’s best interest to be in the custody of one parent.94 Problematic parental 
conduct can be overlooked in the focus on communication and cooperation that Kaplanis 
generated. Possibly the last three B.C. cases discussed reveal a similar tendency but a study of 
trial decisions will be necessary in order to shed proper light on B.C. trends. However, in another 
case involving abuse, Narayan v. Narayan, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appropriateness of 
joint custody/guardianship without making communication the key. The Court referred back to 
the trial judge’s rejection of Mr. Narayan’s claim for joint guardianship, stating:  
This is not an appropriate case for an order for joint custody or joint 
guardianship.  The defendant has admitted assaulting the plaintiff in the past, 
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he has an obvious animosity to her and blames her without justification for 
his problems and he has a demonstrated lack of reliability. … 95 
 
The B.C. Court of Appeal found no basis for interfering with this decision, although it left it 
open to the parties if they wished later to agree to joint guardianship.  
Other cases on (in)ability to communicate include Green v. Millar, where the trial judge 
had found that the father’s attitude made it impossible for the parties to co-operate as joint 
custodial parents. The father had also alleged that the mother was psychotic, which was 
unfounded in the eyes of the trial judge.96 In Chan v. Chan, the trial judge had found that poor 
communication between the parties was clear in evidence and likely to continue in the future.97  
 
Conclusion 
It appears, then, that the Ontario and the B.C. Courts of Appeal differ somewhat in their 
approaches to joint custody, with the Ontario Court of Appeal being more cautious while the 
B.C. Court of Appeal is more neutral as to what evidence might ground a determination of 
whether joint custody was in the best interests of a child. Both Courts – of necessity, given 
governing legislation and Supreme Court of Canada precedents – accept that the only 
consideration in custody and access cases is the best interests of the child, and neither Court 
applies presumptions per se. However the Ontario Court has come closer to an approach that 
says that without clear evidence of ability to cooperate, a joint custody award is inappropriate.  
One could argue that without a strong cautionary statement in a case such as Kaplanis, 
and with a strong directive to look carefully at the evidence in each case in determining an 
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individual child’s best interests, the B.C. Courts are more able to dispense individual justice. 
After all, Huddart J.A.’s instruction to find a child’s best interests within “the practical context of 
the reality of the parents’ lives and circumstances”98 comes close to suggestions from many law 
reform minded scholars who seek to ground decision-making about children in their familial and 
social realities, including the history of care, any abusive relationships, and so on.99 However, in 
a society and legal system that increasingly favours shared parenting, the lack of a cautionary 
precedent in relation to joint custody can equally lead to complacency about its appropriateness 
in circumstances that either generate risk (to a parent or a child) or are simply not conducive to 
consensual decision-making. Some parents, unfortunately, require clear direction from courts in 
order to avoid ongoing disputes and court applications. It must be remembered that the minority 
of parents who appear before judicial panels are, of necessity, in some degree of conflict – 
sometimes high conflict – and that some of these cases involve spousal abuse. As we know from 
Shaffer’s social science review, children do not fare better after divorce in joint custody 
arrangements than they do in sole custody and some children may fare worse, including those in 
high conflict families.100 In addition, parental conflict significantly increases the risk of reduced 
well being on the part of children who experience their parents’ divorce. Joint custody awards 
should therefore be awarded only when the evidence shows that they are appropriate. 
On the whole, it appears that joint custody awards that have reached the B.C. Court of 
Appeal thus far are more about joint decision-making than equal shared time with children.101 As 
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such, the question of what conditions are requisite for reasonably consensual decision-making is 
key. The awarding of joint guardianship in some cases where joint custody was deemed 
inappropriate is somewhat puzzling in this regard, to the extent that joint guardianship is, for 
most purposes, very similar to joint custody. This pattern means that the proportion of joint 
custody awards is higher than might be thought, although apparently not the proportion of shared 
parenting. Perhaps the existence of joint guardianship in B.C., with the potential for orders on the 
“Joyce Model”, makes it possible for judges to craft arrangements that at least to some degree 
control any potential for inappropriate wielding of control via the power given through joint 
guardianship or joint custody. An upcoming review of B.C. trial decisions dealing with joint 
custody will hopefully shed more light on how joint custody (and guardianship) is being dealt 
with in the B.C. courts and whether adequate attention is being paid to whether such orders are 
appropriate, including the ability to communicate and cooperate. Preliminary evidence indicates 
that when joint custody is requested by one party, a majority of awards were in favour of that 
claim, particularly when joint guardianship orders are added. This evidence could support an 
argument that British Columbia has departed from the more cautious approach in Ontario, 
although it is too soon to tell. 
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